SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY
REMARKS AT THE MARSHALL CENTER
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Thank you very much, Dr. Bernstein. It's both an honor and a pleasure for me to be here today at the Marshall Center. All of you know the very dramatic role, the very significant role, that General George Marshall played in Europe after the second World War. Indeed, the Marshall Plan, of course, was named for George Marshall. You may not be aware that he also was the third Secretary of Defense of the United States. If you ever visit my office you will see, in a most prominent place, a large portrait of George Marshall. Because as the 19th Secretary of Defense, I look to him as the model whom I should try to emulate in my role as the Secretary of Defense.

Last month, I took part in the ceremonies celebrating the departure of allied forces from Berlin. The first thing I did upon my arrival in Berlin was go to Clay Barracks, where the American brigade had been based, and received the last American flag flying over that barracks in Berlin. This is a flag which had great sentimental value and significance to me. I'm going to establish a special display in the Pentagon honoring that flag and what it stood for. I spoke to the assembled Americans and Germans and then went down and talked to them individually after the speech. I was surprised to see that many of the Germans in the audience actually had tears in their eyes. I thought at the time, this may be the first time in history when an occupying force has left the country and the people of that country actually shed tears over the departure. And I thought that said worlds about the conduct of the forces within Germany in general, and in Berlin in particular. And, it also said worlds about the German people's dedication to moving on in the new democratic world in which we now live.

At the same time these ceremonies were taking place in Berlin, another event was taking place thousands of miles to the east. The U.S. 3rd Infantry Division and the Russian 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division were conducting joint peacekeeping exercises in Totskoye, Russia. These two events, occurring simultaneously, bring home to us how different the European security environment is as a result of the end of the Cold War. Allied guards who stood guard for freedom for decades are no longer needed in Berlin. Indeed, U.S. troops were in Russia itself, conducting

peacekeeping exercises with the Russian troops they formerly opposed. You could hardly find a more powerful symbol of how greatly the world has changed in the last few years. Indeed, the other symbol that is equally as powerful, I see in front of me today. The troops of all of the former nations of the Warsaw Pact, meeting here at the very Center that we had analysts and linguists studying how to deal with the threat posed by their military forces.

The great British writer, Samuel Johnson, once wrote that change is inconvenient, even when it's for the better. Certainly what is happening in Russia today is exemplified by those exercises. What is happening at the Marshall Center, what has happened in Berlin, is change that is for the better. But all of us have experienced some of the inconveniences that go with this change. It has forced us to modify the institutions and procedures that were the West's security anchors during these last four decades. Chief among those anchors is the transatlantic relationship between America and our allies in Europe. Today, I'd like to talk about that relationship and what we must all do to adapt it to the new requirements of the today's world.

We now face a new era with new dangers. The dangers are different than they were during the Cold War, but they are still very real. There are regional conflicts, ethnic and sectarian upheaval, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to name just a few. At the same time, while we are dealing with these dangers, we have the task of consolidating the peace between East and West. Our grandest hope is for a future Europe in which no nation threatens its neighbors -- in which there are no common enemies.

We seek a transatlantic security system embracing the United States and Canada, as well as all of Europe. It must be rooted in common commitments to democracy and free economies. It must be rooted in mutual respect for human rights. And, it must be rooted in the independence of the nations in this system and the security of borders. NATO is playing an essential role in achieving that vision.

Beginning with the launching of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the alliance has made a concerted effort to reach out to its old adversaries of the former Warsaw Pact, including many of your nations. This not only helps your countries, but it is clearly in our interest as well. A Europe united by a commitment to democracy and free economies will not

only be more secure, but also will be freed from the necessity of maintaining large, expensive standing armies and military forces. NATO is serving as one of the principal institutions for this integration of Eastern Europe with Western Europe. It's a remarkable demonstration of NATO adapting to this new era. The irony of NATO's role in this is tangible. NATO, after all, was originally created to deal with the problem of a divided Europe. And now, it is among the most active institutions in trying to overcome those divisions and integrate Western and Eastern Europe.

NATO's key program for doing that is the Partnership for Peace, with which you are all very familiar. Last May, I was at a NATO ministerial meeting in Belgium. At that meeting, we invited the Defense Ministers of the newly joined members of the Partnership for Peace. The NATO Defense Ministers and the Defense Ministers from the Eastern European countries all went out to SHAPE headquarters in Mons, Belgium. We had a ceremony there, opening the so-called NATO Coordination Cell, where we do the planning for the Partnership for Peace.

It was one of the most impressive ceremonies I have ever attended. We stood there, Gen. Joulwan and myself, and he had arranged to have all of the flags of the participating nations. They were lined up in alphabetical order -- 35 flags -- 16 NATO nations and, at that time, 19 Partnership for Peace nations. There they were, in alphabetical order, from Albania on the left to the United States of America on the right, and everything in between. As we stood there and saw, one-by-one, those flags being raised, we realized that we were really launching something new and profoundly different and it had the potential for profoundly substantial change.

The Partnership for Peace was specifically designed to avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe, which would replace the old animosities. Indeed, since then we've had three more nations join. One of them, most significantly, was Russia. These partners then, will have the chance to develop the cooperative habits that lie at the heart of an effective alliance. They will be able to join alliance forces in training for military activities such as peacekeeping efforts, disaster relief, and search and rescue operations. Partners will have the opportunity to pick up NATO's standard operating procedures and routines of consultation. Over time, the partners will develop forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO, thereby creating a broad, stable, peaceful European security system -- one that replaces the old Cold War divisions and animosities.

We want a free, democratic Russia to take its place in this new security system. We believe that security system is best based on a practical and cooperative relationship between NATO and Russia, not by closing Russia out. We have a relationship with Russia which will acknowledge Russia's important role in Europe's future, but without granting it any special rights over its neighbors' affairs.

The vision of a Europe united by a commitment to democracy and market economies cannot be achieved by excluding any country. In particular, it cannot be achieved by excluding Russia. At the same time, PFP achieves those benefits, it is providing a vehicle for eventual membership in NATO. Many partners have expressed an interest in eventually joining NATO. And, the NATO allies have made clear that they welcome expansion of NATO through an evolutionary process that takes full account of the security developments in Europe. The Partnership will help prepare nations for possible membership, if they take full advantage of the opportunities and adhere to the path toward democracy, peaceful relations with their neighbors, and economic reform. This Partnership has already made significant progress. I just returned, two days ago, from the NATO Defense Ministers meeting in Seville. This meeting is the successor to the meeting held a year ago in Travemuende, in which the Partnership was created. In that one year's time, we've gone from concept to the creation of a Cooperation Cell in Mons, to the establishment of 23 new members in the Partnership for Peace, and to the beginning of a robust program in training and exercise.

But if NATO is to truly adapt to the new world, and if the Partnership is to reach its full potential, we must be able to deal with long-submerged ethnic and religious conflicts. Determining what role is appropriate in these types of conflicts is one of the most difficult decisions that NATO faces. Indeed, at the NATO Defense Ministers meeting from which I just returned, that was the primary issue of discussion -- What is the proper role of NATO in trying to bring about peace in Bosnia?

Many observers have argued that Bosnia demonstrates the failure of NATO, because NATO has not yet succeeded in achieving a peace plan there. In fact, I believe that Bosnia is a symbol of both the problem and the potential for NATO. It demonstrates that NATO, when applied appropriately, can be used to respond to ethnic violence. In Bosnia, we're

making a major effort to get the combatants to end the hostilities and then achieve a sustainable peace agreement. But while this process is underway, NATO has played a uniquely important role. That is, first of all, dramatically lowering the level of violence. And secondly, alleviating the suffering while the war is going on. Let me just recite very briefly what NATO is doing in Bosnia, why I think it's important and why I think, on balance, it's quite positive.

We are first of all using the military arm of NATO, the air power in particular, to enforce a "no aerial bombardment" policy in Bosnia. Many of us have forgotten that well over a year ago Serbian planes were bombing cities in Bosnia. NATO then established the "no-fly zone" and has subsequently enforced it. There has been, since that time -- well over a year now -- only one attempt to bomb a city in Bosnia. In that case, six planes went out and actually began the bombing of a Bosnian city. NATO airplanes intercepted those six, shot down three of them, and since that time there has been no recurrence of an attempt to bomb cities.

We have extended that also to artillery bombardment in Sarajavo and Gorazde ~~Grazjda~~, and have effectively stopped the massive bombardment that was going on in Sarajavo. Before that time, there had been almost 10,000 civilians killed by the bombardment of that city. Since last February, that has been effectively stopped, and has been stopped by the threat of the use of NATO air power. In addition to that military use of NATO, in a deterrence sense you might say, we have also had a massive air lift and air drop underway to provide humanitarian relief to the people of Bosnia. If you put all of these programs together, I think it is demonstratively clear that NATO's intervention has saved tens of thousands of lives, perhaps hundreds of thousands of lives in Bosnia within the last year or two.

Through the Partnership for Peace, its efforts in Bosnia, and other initiatives, NATO has shown that it is relevant to today's world. The challenge for all of our countries, ours and yours alike, is to show the foresight, leadership and flexibility necessary to deal with the problems of today's world -- regional and ethnic conflicts, peacekeeping, and humanitarian crises. You sitting here in this room -- you are the generation that will transform your defense establishments. You will make them responsive to civilian control. But, it is up to you. My colleague, Malcolm Rifkind, who is the Minister of Defense of the United Kingdom, said in the meeting just the other day that the Colonels and Lt. Colonels of the Eastern

and Central European countries are the future of Europe today. What they do and how they develop the military in their countries will determine to a very great extent, how their democracies evolve and what the security of Europe will be in the future. Your studies here at the Marshall Center are a key part of our overall effort to build relationships among nations that will allow us to do that. Your understanding of the democratic process and the military's role in that democratic process will bind Europe to new values.

I'm going to conclude my talk with a favorite quote of mine from the British novelist, Graeham Greene. He said, "there always comes a moment in time when the door opens and lets the future in." The ending of the Cold War is such a time. It has opened a door. The future is out there, waiting to come in. By our actions, we can control that future. By your activities here at the Marshall Center and your actions when you return to your countries, you have the possibility of shaping that future to make the world a safer world for your children and my children.

Thank you very much.

Questions & Answers:

QUESTION: First, I would like to thank you . I think all my colleagues join me in thanking the U.S. government for the ability to be here and to be pioneers in the first class of the Marshall Center. I assure you that the American taxpayers' money is very well spent. And, I think that this is one of the best investments. One which will create a greater profit than any investment in military equipment. As we are thinking here about the power of the purse, actually this is the reason behind my intervention. We would like to ask you to use your influence with the Congress to get more funds for this Center, which is really promoting cooperztion between former adversaries.

SECRETARY PERRY: I would be happy to comment on that point. I testified to our Congress, just last week, that I thought the most effective defense funds we have were those that we used for the Marshall Center and for the IMET program, which is an education and training program. We get more defense per dollar for these programs than anything else that I know of in the budget. I asked them not only for their continued support for these programs, but said we believe that we should be increasing the funding for them in the years ahead, that the Defense Department intended to propose that , and that we wanted support in the Congress in doing so. Now, ultimately, as you all know by now from studying our system, the Congress dertermines the disposition of funds for our Defense and State Department.s.

It has been my experience in working with Congress that if we can make a strong case for what we are doing, and they understand that the leadership in both the Defense and State Departments powerfully believes in programs like this, they will usually support us. And, I believe we will get that support; and not only continuation, but the expansion of these programs. This has been a problem in the past, particularly with the IMET program, the education and training program. This was partly because IMET was not fully understood in Congress and not supported strongly enough; but I think it has that support now. I can give you a lot of confidence on that.

QUESTION: I think the Center really needs money to have, for instance, computers. I imagine that you could have computers in all the rooms in the student hostel just to have a network and an e-mail system . I think this would help a lot. Our professors, are really working very hard, but sometimes they lack the small, clever gadgets of the 20th century. I think

that (having) computers is very important -- and especially for the library. The library, just between us, is working with methods of the last century. They really need money to obtain not only computers and CD ROMs and access to data bases, but just to get traditional, conventional books like the one that is reviewed in "Foreign Affairs," in the July-August edition, which is entitled "Global Engagement, Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century." This book is published in Washington by the Brookings Institution. According to the review, there are several authors of the book, among them a gentleman by the name of William Perry. Now, may I ask the author of this book about cooperative security, which is the main item in this book.

SECRETARY PERRY: On the first point, I fully support the importance of computers in training and educational programs. And, I will explore, if we do not have sufficient funds under our budget to do that, the possibility of getting foundation support for computers. Or, one of the computer companies may wish to do this as a public relations gesture.

SECRETARY PERRY: (unintelligible) "Global Engagement and Cooperative Security," a book of which I was one of the authors, did not imply institutional integration. What was envisioned in that study was that the different nations would come to a prior agreement on the size of their military forces -- we are talking about conventional military forces here -- based on the principle that the primary use for military forces was defense of land and defense of boundaries. And, that forces excess to that would either be reduced or would be available for an international force, which could be used to enforce violations of the agreement. This envisioned a form of cooperation among nations in international security which is far beyond where we are today. I don't see any prospect of getting that kind of an agreement this year or next year. If we'd had such agreements before the split-up occurred in Yugoslavia, it would have, first of all, dramatically reduced the level of violence occuring in that country. And secondly, it might even have made it impossible for that civil war to get underway to the extent that it did. So, I still believe that the idea is sound, but it envisions, when you are talking about cooperative security, it envisions nations voluntarily agreeing to do this. And there was no punishment, no military force applied -- no coercion applied -- to make that happen. The book did spell out some incentives to persuade nations to join, which had mostly to do with trade agreements and with sharing of technology and sharing of

military data. It is a wonderful idea, but it is certainly several years away at best.

QUESTION: I would like to hear your comments on a very technical issue. The first one concerns the cooperation between Western countries and Central Europe in space. In spite of the wide range of declarations, when you got to the practical level of cooperation, we still face certain obstacles. As an example I'd like to find out about the Brown Amendment and the problems with the United States Congress on this amendment. My first question is why we still face obstacles and barriers to practical cooperation? The second question concerns this place. The idea of this Center is really great. It would be much more interesting to have the opportunity to discus with a broader representation oif Western countries. My question is, where are the other NATO participants?

SECRETARY PERRY: Al, let me ask you to restate the first question, I'm not sure I caught the full dimensions of that one.

DIRECTOR BERNSTEIN: Why do we still have a holdup on the Brown Amendment?

QUESTION: On the Brown Amendment, concerning the enlargement of the list of countries which have a certain ability to receive some military assistance from the United States. This is still being discussed in the United States Congress, the so-called Brown Amendment.

SECRETARY PERRY: I'm sorry , sir, I don't know the answer to the first question. Joe, do you have any comment on that?

DR. KRUZEL: We feel, in the Administration, that the Brown Amendment is not necessary because we already have a program of support for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed the President, in Warsaw, announeed an initiative that we will give 100 million dollars to countries to help them take advantage of Partnership for Peace, 25 million of that he earmarked for Poland, that is in next year's budget. So we see nothing that the Brown Amendment will add to the programs that we already have underway.

SECRETARY PERRY: There was a second question which had to do with NATO. Maybe Al , Dr. Bernstein, can bring you up to date on what is being planned in that regard.

DR. BERNSTEIN: First I want to make it clear that NATO participation was, in fact, invited. And I think two things conspired to prevent it from happening in the first class. First, the syllabus, as its designed, is constructed to emphasize democratization. I think, at first blush, NATO officers might have felt they wouldn't profit that much by what the Marshall Center had to teach. Secondly, we are all in a drawdown, so I think manpower was probably a major issue. On behalf of the NATO countries, almost all of them have programs like this. And I know that there are efforts underway in NATO headquarters to coordinate those programs. And, perhaps, they will include the Marshall Center in thea coordination process. To harmonize the various bilateral activites which are going on with countries to the East. It occurred to me fairly recently that someof the NATO countries that are sstanding up such programs might benefit by having their officers, thoise who will be engaged in these efforts, to spend some time at the Marshall Center to learn from the experience we have already had.

QUESTION: (unintelligible) ...that you have come here, and I think this will have an historical significance. We have a proposal to have, after the official program, perhaps to have a picture opportunity for all the students here for the first course of the Marshall Center.

SECRETARY PERRY: I'd be delighted. I might also say that besides meeting with the NATO defense ministers at NATO meetings, I meet with East European and Central European defense ministers both at the once-a-year meeting, to which they are invited, and I have organized my schedule to have bilateral meetings both in their countries and in our country. I have met in the last six months probably two or three times with the Minister of Defense of Russia, most recently four days ago, and I've met several times with the Minister of Defense of Ukraine, with the Minister of Defense of Kazakstan, Belarus, Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia. I think that is an important part of my job, to establish effective bilateral relationships with these defense ministers as well as the relationships through the NATO institutions.

QUESTION: As you probably know we are from all the Eastern countries, except Yugoslavia, of course. My question is about the situation in former Yugoslavia and about the use of the embargo as a political method. Do you think that this embargo is efficient, or not? I am asking this because every day Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria are loosing a lot of good American money to enforce this embargo. And we are not guilty, not at all. I am very interested in your opinion about the efficiency of embargoes, in the former Yugoslavia and in any other part of the world.

SECRETARY PERRY: That is a very good question. And I'll give you as careful an answer as I can. Let me answer specific to the former Yugoslavia, because the history of embargoes and sanctions has been very checkered. Sometimes they have been quite successful, very often they've not had any useful effect at all. In the case of Yugoslavia, I believe it is demonstrably true that the embargo of arms and supplies into former Yugoslavia has had a very substantial effect. I think, most importantly, that when the peace plan was accepted by the Bosnian government and was rejected by the Bosnian Serbs. That Serbia put very great pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to accept that peace plan, and in effect broke relations with them as a consequence of their not accepting the peace plan. Whatever chance there is of getting that peace plan accepted, draws primarily on two factors: one is the pressure that is effected through NATO's continued use of air power; and second is the pressure which the Serbian government is putting on the Bosnian Serbs. And the reason the Serbian government is doing that is because they want to be relieved of the embargo, just as you want to be relieved of that embargo.

For obvious reasons it is an economic disaster for both countries. It is entirely possible that some facets of that embargo against former Yugoslavia will be removed in the near future as a result of the actions that Serbia is taking. If we can get that peace plan finally approved, then we can drop the whole thing. It is a painful tool to apply. But, it has been as effective as any sanction that I've ever seen in that it is causing the nations to which it is applied to take the political actions which we wanted them to take. It is a form of diplomacy called coercive diplomacy. You have a diplomatic goal that you want to achieve, which in this case the establishment of the peace plan, and you are using power short of war to try to coerce a country into taking that action. And the two coercive tools available to us in Bosnia -- short of actually going in and getting involved in a major war in Bosnia --

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are the use of NATO air power to hold down the level of violence there, and the sanctions to put pressure on the Serbs.

QUESTION: As you pointed out, sir, the Partnership for Peace is a process that is well underway. My question is, will it be that the Partnership for Peace will continue in the future? To build cooperation between our countries and the organizations of NATO and the other organizations? I'd like to know, after building this Partnership for Peace, do our countries have membership in NATO, or is there any other step?

SECRETARY PERRY: That is a very clear question, to which I will give you an answer that is not quite as clear. It would be nice to say it will happen in so many months or so many years, but I cannot say that. First of all, I observe that not all partners are interested in or want to become members of NATO. But for those who do, there is a what I can best describe as a process that has to unfold. The process has two different elements to it. One is the continuing integration of the political and economic aspects of that country into Western Europe. And all of the countries that really want to become members of NATO are in the process of effecting that integration now.

The other element is becoming more and more effective with the NATO military organization so that the country can work more cooperatively with it. This is because if NATO were to become involved in a military operation, your troops could participate fully and effectively in that. The Partnership for Peace is designed not only to help those nations which want to become members of NATO take the first important steps in that direction. The joint training, the joint exercises, the operating procedures, and defense planning, all of those are intended to take those nations which want to become NATO members important steps down the road.

This issue was discussed at some length at the Defense Ministers' meeting in Spain earlier this week. Nobody was able to put a time table on it at that meeting. But everybody could agree on the steps that needed to be taken. The best estimates that I got from people there were that these steps could take a few years. Nobody was thinking about a few months, nobody was thinking about six or seven years, so somewhere between that period of time. It is not imminent, but neither is it in the distant future. I think every nation there committed to the principle of expanding NATO to include Central and Eastern European countries that, first of all, want to become

members, and secondly, that have achieved economic, political and military integration as precursor steps to that happening.

QUESTION: The world community and many nations are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and Ukraine has voluntarily gotten rid of its nuclear weapons. Experts agree that many nations are capable of producing nuclear weapons. How, in your opinion, should nations act when there are such nations that are able to join the nuclear club and it will be a wider circel of nations having these weapons?

SECRETARY PERRY: You have touched on one of the most difficult security problems we face in the world today. I want to start off by saying how pleased I am by the actions taken by the Ukrainian government to dismantle its nuclear weapons. There has been some debate betwen the government and the parliament in Ukraine, the Rada, as to how fast that process should move forward. But, the government has been steadfast and has been very, very effective in moving forward on this dismantlement.

One of my most memorable experiences as Secretary of Defense was to visit the intercontinental ballistic missle site at Pervomaysk, in Ukraine, where I was shown the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in process. And there have been hundreds of nuclear weapons already taken out of Ukraine and sent for dismantlement.

While this dismantlement process is going on, there are a handfull of nations -- five or six nations in the world -- that are struggling to become members of the nuclear club. We are using every form of diplomacy available to us, both individually as a nation and collectively with other nations, to try to prevent that from happening.

In the case of Iraq, we continue to maintain very strong and very effective sanctions against that country and we continue to have an intrusive inspection regime, specifically to keep them from starting a nuclear weapon program again, which we believe they have every desire and every capability of doing. This is a form of coercive diplomacy at its most coercive, at its most intrusive. In the case of Iran, and in Libya, we are very concerned about the problem. The diplomacy we've applied so far has been short of coercion, but I believe we are prepared to become coercive if their programs move far enough along to become threatening.

In the case of North Korea, one of the most substantial security problems that I face as Secretary of Defense is trying to deal with the on-going nuclear weapon development program in North Korea. With North Korea we are using a combination of persuasive diplomacy and coercive diplomacy. Persuasion is offering the North Koreans the installation of a commercial nuclear reactor to provide the power for their country, if they will shut down and dsismantle the reactors, which not only provide electrical power but also provide weapon grade plutonium. We are being very forthcoming and persuasive in that regard. On the other hand, if that does not succeed, we are prepared to become very coercive. In particular, to go to the United Nations and request sanctions as the first step in the coercion. The problem with North Korea is complicated by the fact that they not only pose a threat of nuclear weapons, but that they have a conventional army of one million men, two thirds of whom are based within 100 kilometers of the North-South Korean border. This, I think, you could fairly call forward deployment, a threatening deployment. For those reasons, we are particularly concerned about North Korea, both because the nuclear program is very advanced and because it is coupled with a very threatening conventional army.

There is no simple solution or formula that I can give you for dealing with this problem, only that I think that the United States and the internatioal commuity needs to stand very firm against nuclear proliferation -- including the willingness to be coercive in dealing with countries that persist in moving forward with nuclear programs.

End of transcript.